A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.Expand

The degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic is quantified and it is proved that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency.Expand

It is established that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria, and its results are extended to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network.Expand

It is proved that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed).Expand

A survey of recent work that analyzes the price of anarchy of selfish routing, a classical mathematical model of how self-interested users might route traffic through a congested network.Expand

It is proved that in routing games, smoothness arguments are "complete" in a proof-theoretic sense: despite their automatic generality, they are guaranteed to produce an optimal worst-case upper bound on the price of anarchy.Expand

This work designs and analyzes approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings and gives an auction that, for every environment and unknown valuation distributions, has expected revenue at least a constant fraction of the expected optimal welfare.Expand

Every potential user u, no matter what its side information and preferences, derives as much utility from M* as from interacting with a differentially private mechanism Mu that is optimally tailored to u, subject to differential privacy.Expand

It is shown that under weak hypotheses on the class of allowable edge latency functions, the worst-case ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of a minimum-latency routing for any multicommodity flow network is achieved by a single-commodity instance on a set of parallel links.Expand

This work identifies a “canonical sufficient condition” for an upper bound on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria, and proves that in congestion games, smoothness arguments are “complete” in a proof-theoretic sense: despite their automatic generality, they are guaranteed to produce optimal worst-case upper bounds on thePrice of anarchy.Expand